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NOTE
"HEY SIRI, WHAT DOES THE GOVERNMENT
KNOW ABOUT ME?":
INCREASING THE VOLUME ON SMART SPEAKER

AWARENESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Hey Alexa, play my favorite music."' Smart speakers2 have a wide
variety of capabilities. 3 By connecting the home to the Internet, users are
able to ask the device to do anything from playing music, to locking the
doors, to lowering the temperature in the home.4 It is estimated that as of
the end of 2019, there were over ninety million smart speakers in the
United States and over 200 million smart speakers worldwide. 5 In fact,
smart speaker usage is set to overtake tablet use by 2021.6

1. See generally Alera Features Help, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2021) (explaining the commands used to get the attention
of Amazon's smart speaker and virtual assistant, Alexa). Alexa is capable of referencing the user's
prior music selections and playing songs that the speaker believes are the user's favorite. Id.
"Alexa" is the wake word for the Amazon smart speaker that triggers the recording, which is sent to
the cloud. Id. Alexa is able to speak, comprehend, and complete the user's commands. Id. Alexa is
programmed to be able to play music, order through Amazon.com, and dim the lights, among other
functions. Id.
2. A smart speaker is a voice-controlled compact device placed within one's home that can
connect the home to the Internet and complete a variety of tasks as directed by the user, such as
raising the volume, checking the weather, or playing music. Robert Silva, What Is a Smart
Speaker?, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/smart-speaker-4145037 (Dec. 2, 2020).
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. See Robert Williams, Smart Speakers to Top Tablet Use by 2021, Forecast Says,
MARKETING DIVE (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.marketingdive.com/news/smart-speakers-to-toptablet-use-by-2021-forecast-says (explaining the rapid growth in popularity of smart speakers and
the total number of smart speakers expected to be in homes by 2023); Steve Ranger, End of an Era:
Soon Smart Speakers Will Outnumber Tablets, ZDNET (Apr. 15, 2019, 6:59 AM),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/end-of-an-era-soon-smart-speakers-will-outnumber-tablets.
6. Ranger, supra note 5 (explaining how smart speakers have become increasingly popular
in the United States and around the world).
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Although these devices can provide modern conveniences, they can
7
also intrude on one's privacy by listening to one's conversations. If
asked directly if it is listening all the time, the device will generally
return an answer along the lines of, "I only record and send audio back
to the Amazon cloud when you say the wake word." 8 However,
according to cybersecurity experts, smart speakers may be recording
conversations even when one does not directly or intentionally use the
"wake word."9 It is estimated that in the course of a ten-minute
conversation, a smart speaker may mishear ten to thirty words, which
10
may cause the device to begin recording at any time. Although all of
the giant technology (or "tech") companies, including Apple, Amazon,
and Google, give assurances that customer data is kept safe and is not
given out freely to third parties, these assurances ring hollow in the day
and age of constant security breaches and demand for consumer
information."
Consumers are also growing increasingly aware of the fact that
smart speakers may be listening to their conversations and recording
3
them.1 2 Nevertheless, smart speaker sales continue to rise.' The growing
awareness of the risk of being recorded is likely why some jurisdictions
are creating regulations to try to stop tech companies from keeping
14
consumer's private data and using it for their own benefit.
The cause for concern is even greater when it comes to the
5
government's ability to access the data collected by smart speakers.'
7.

See

How

Creepy

Is

Your

Smart

Speaker?,

ECONOMIST

(May

11,

2019),

(explaining that
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/05/11/how-creepy-is-your-smart-speaker
in to your
listening
be
may
they
that
cost
the
with
come
speakers
smart
of
the conveniences
conversations and compromising your security).
8. Id.
9. Jen Monnier, Your SmartSpeaker Records You More Often Than You Think, SCIENCELINE
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://scienceline.org/2018/04/smart-speaker-records-often-think.
10. Id.
11. Hugh Langley & Jennifer Pattison Tuohy, Smart Home Privacy: What Amazon, Google
https://www.theand Apple Do with Your Data, AMBIENT (Nov. 8, 2019),
33 8
; see generally Dan
ambient.com/features/how-amazon-google-apple-use-smart-speaker-dataSwinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Jan. 8, 2021, 2:00 AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.htm
(listing the largest data breaches that have occurred in the twenty-first century and explaining how
many consumers were impacted).
On Buying Them,
12. Allison Ingersoll, Users Worry About Smart Speaker Privacy, But Keep
9
9
-0 -05/users-worryBLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201
about-smart-speaker-privacy-keep-on-buying-them.
13. Id.
14. See id.
for Spying,
15. Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted It Will Use Smart Home Devices
9
2
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016, 3:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 016/feb/0 /inte
(discussing how the U.S.
met-of-things-smart-devices-spying-surveillance-us-government
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The data collected by smart speakers can be used by the government to
get a detailed look at one's homelife.1 6 In fact, recordings obtained by
the government from an Amazon Echo were used as evidence in the
State of Arkansas' case to support a first-degree murder charge." While
some states have taken action on wider cybersecurity and data privacy
concerns, they do not specifically regulate smart speakers and, more
importantly, what information the government can access from these
smart speakers without a warrant.18
The laws passed range from extensive privacy and cybersecurity
reform, as in California, to simple reactive laws instructing companies
what to do once a data breach has occurred.' 9 This range in regulation on
a state-by-state basis creates hurdles and inefficiencies for corporations
by having to potentially comply with up to fifty different statutes and
guidelines. 20 Furthermore, this patchwork of regulation does little to
protect consumers' private data and gives them very few, if any, options
to limit the data that is gathered by technology companies. 21 Much of
this data can simply be passed onto the government, without a warrant,
to further a prosecutor's case. 22 It is for this reason that smart speakers
government indicated that it would use data gathered from devices connected to the "Internet of
things" ("IoT") to gather intelligence). This Note defines the IoT as the many devices, like
thermostats, cameras, and other appliances, that are connected to the Internet via smart devices. See
infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
16.

See Timm, supra note 15.

17.

State v. Bates, No. CR20160370, 2016 WL 7627013 (Ark. Cir. Sept. 7, 2016); Colin

Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case that Hinged on Evidence from Amazon Echo,

NPR
(Nov.
29,
2017,
5:42
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/11/29/567305812/arkansas-prosecutors-drop-murder-case-that-hinged-on-evidence-fromamazon-echo.
18. See Virtual Home Assistants and the Laws and Regulations Struggling to Keep Up with
the Times, IE EXPONENTIAL LEARNING (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ie.edu/exponential-

learning/blog/business/virtual-home-assistants-laws-regulations-struggling-keep-times
(explaining
that while some states have passed general cybersecurity laws, there are no laws directly regulating
smart speakers); John Adams, A Seismic Shift: What Calfornia'sNew Privacy Law Means for
Cybersecurity, SEC. MAG. (July 5, 2018), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/89201-aseismic-shift-what-californias-new-privacy-law-means-for-cybersecurity; see also Benjy Schirm,
Smart Speakers and the Violation of Our Civil Rights, SUPER LAWS. (Feb. 7, 2021),
https://www.superlawyers.com/united-states/article/smart-speakers-and-the-violation-of-our-civilrights/00643e59-f7b3-4b34-b364-Of802635da9d.html.
19. See Adams, supra note 18 (explaining the extent of the newly-passed California
cybersecurity law).
20. See Taylor Armerding, Awash in Regulations, Companies Struggle with Compliance,
SYNOPSYS (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/regulatorycompliance-challenges (explaining the difficulties of many companies when trying to comply with
new cybersecurity and data privacy regulations).
21. Nuala O'Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protectionand Privacy, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-dataprotection.
22. See Schirm, supra note 18.
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pose a particularly important data privacy risk as the data they collect
pierces metadata 23 and allows the government to access the actual raw
24
data collected by smart speakers.
This Note will begin by explaining the issues surrounding why
smart speakers are unlike other types of smart devices and why they
25
pose a particular threat to an individual's right to privacy. Part III will
then discuss the history of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy,
particularly its evolution from protecting against common law trespass
6
to a broader right of privacy.2 Part IV proposes that the U.S. Supreme
27
Court grant certiorari on a case involving smart speakers. The hope
would be that the Supreme Court would expand upon all citizens' Fourth
Amendment privacy rights to explicitly include data collected by smart
speakers and to make it impermissible for the government to obtain such
28
information without a proper warrant.
WHY SMART SPEAKERS POSE A PARTICULAR THREAT THAT IS IN
NEED OF ACTION

II.

This Part will discuss what kind of information is collected by
smart speakers as well as the quantity of data collected by these devices
and what makes this information different from other types of data that
warrant Fourth Amendment protection against unjustified government
access.29 Subpart A will discuss what kind of information is gathered by
smart speakers. 30 Subpart B will go on to discuss why smart speakers
pose a particular issue that should be dealt with accordingly by the
Supreme Court. 31

3, 2019),
What Is Metadata?, LIFEWIRE (June
Mike Chapple,
23. See
77
. "Metadata is data about
https://www.lifewire.com/metadata-definition-and-examples-10191
data." Id. Metadata can give someone an overall, holistic view of larger trends and can generally
describe data that is part of the macroeconomic trend. Id. Nevertheless, metadata is not the data
itself, and although helpful, metadata does not give you the information about specific individuals
or any other specific transactions or interactions. Id.
24.
25.

See id.; Monnier, supra note 9.
See infra Part II.

26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra PartIV.
28.

See infra Part IV.

29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.
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What Information Is Collected by Smart Speakers?

This Subpart will lay out the kinds of information that are gathered
by smart speakers. 32 However, to fully understand all of the threats that
smart speakers pose, it is important to understand how a smart speaker
works. 33 Smart speakers can perform a variety of tasks, from ordering a
pizza to informing you what the weather is going to be like next week,
and this is all done through a voice-controlled digital assistant. 34 Many
of the big tech companies have their own version of a digital assistant, 35
but they all generally perform the same functions. 36 In order to activate
the digital assistant to get it to perform a task, one must first use the
"wake word." 37 While many large tech companies claim that their smart
speaker is only listening for the "wake word," and only then will the
device start recording, this is generally not the case because smart
speakers often mishear words and begin recording conversations without
the knowledge of the user.3 8
Smart speakers are constantly listening to conversations and are
collecting data that is being transmitted to servers which store this
information. 39 The kinds of information being collected by smart
speakers are vast and can range from location data to actual recordings
of one's voice conversations. 40 Generally, downloading applications
("apps")-like Tinder, LinkedIn, and Facebook-onto a phone allows
these tech companies to collect and store data so that they can target
advertisements and align an individual's feed with targeted messaging
that these companies believe that the individual might be interested in. 1
Similarly, on smart speakers, users can use apps that they have
downloaded via their virtual assistant.42 These apps all include terms and

32.

See infra Part I.A.

33. See Emma Stenhouse, Smart Speakers - How Do They Work?, EVOLVING SCI. (Nov. 15,
2017), https://www.evolving-science.com/intelligent-machines/smart-speakers-how-do-they-work00483.
34. See id.; Silva, supra note 2.
35. Parker Hall & Jeffery Van Camp, The Best Smart Speakers with Alexa, Google Assistant
and Siri, WIRED (Nov. 26, 2020, 8:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/story/best-smart-speakers
(explaining the different types of assistants found in smart speakers and their various features).
36. Id.
37. Monnier, supra note 9.
38. See id.
39. Langley & Tuohy, supra note 11 (explaining how data is gathered and stored on tech
company servers). It is important to note that, by default, smart speakers do not store or send audio
unless activated with the chosen "wake word." See id.

40. Tom Calver & Joe Miller, What Tech Giants Really Do with Your Data, BBC NEWS (July
5, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44702483.
41. Id.
42.

See, e.g., Alexa Features Help, supra note 1.
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conditions to ensure that the user is bound by the app's rules while using
43
the platform; however, oftentimes people do not even read the terms.
These terms allow companies like Facebook to keep a user's search
history, even after it has been "deleted."' Moreover, Facebook is not the
only company that does this: Amazon has also been known to hold onto
45
smart speaker data even after it has been "deleted." As discussed in
Part IV, these policies used by tech companies give rise to privacy and
cybersecurity issues that need to be addressed with a comprehensive and
46
national solution to the issue.
Furthermore, not only might conversations be recorded while the
individual is unaware, but there also may be a human analyst from
47
Amazon, Apple, or Google listening in on that person's conversation.
Each of the three largest smart speaker companies acknowledges that
there are human analysts listening in on some conversations, and their
48
rationale is that it helps the company to improve speech recognition.
While these companies claim that there is no personally identifiable
information being transmitted to analysts with the recordings, the voices
49
are not always changed.
Therefore, the analyst is reviewing raw data that pierces the
50
metadata and is able to access the unadulterated recordings. What is
even more alarming is that there is no setting that can disable human
analysis of these recordings, and there is no prominent disclaimer in
which individuals are told that their conversations may be monitored,
recorded, or reviewed." Furthermore, there is no law prohibiting any of
these technology companies from turning over these recordings to the
government.52 Currently, the only protection against government access

43. See Calver & Miller, supra note 40.
44. Id. (explaining that while Facebook offers an option to delete one's search history,
Facebook oftentimes holds on to a user's deleted search history for up to six months).
45. Makena Kelly & Nick Statt, Amazon Confirms It Holds On to Alexa Data Even if You
PM),
4:14
2019,
3,
(July
VERGE
Files,
Audio
Delete
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/3/20681423/amazon-alexa-echo-chris-coons-data-transcriptsrecording-privacy (explaining that Amazon has admitted to holding on to users' personal data, even
after it has been "deleted" by the user).
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See Smart Speaker Recordings Reviewed by Humans, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019),
82

.

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-478930
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id.; see also Chapple, supra note 23.
51. See Smart Speaker RecordingsReviewed by Humans, supra note 47.
52. See

Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in Government

Surveillance, 131 HARv. L. REV. 1722, 1722, 1728 (2018) (explaining how the tech companies
themselves decide whether or not to cooperate or resist the requests from the government for

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/7
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to these recordings comes from the tech companies themselves who
created the smart speakers.5 3
B.

What Makes the Information Gatheredby Smart Speakers Unique?

This Subpart will discuss why smart speakers pose a unique threat
that needs to be addressed more urgently than general privacy concerns
involving other kinds of smart devices.54 Smart speakers pose a
particular threat to an individual's right to privacy because they are
constantly listening and transmitting actual data to servers." Smart
speakers can and do record intimate conversations in the homes of
Americans. 56 The data collected by smart speakers during these
conversations is instantly accessible to tech companies, and the
government faces a low bar in obtaining this information for
prosecutorial purposes unless they face pushback from the tech
companies themselves.57 By piercing the metadata, smart speakers give
the actual data of individuals to anyone who reviews the recordings by
being able to listen to the person's voice, usually unaltered, albeit the
tech companies claim human reviewers never receive identifying
information or location data.5 8
Recently, this concern has been brought to the forefront of media
attention in the case of State v. Bates,59 a homicide case that concerned
whether the Arkansas State government could access recordings made
by an Amazon Echo smart speaker. 60 Mr. Bates was charged with the
murder of one of his friends, who, after a night of drinking and watching
football, was found by Mr. Bates floating unconscious face down in his
hot tub. 61 Mr. Bates's home was equipped with an Amazon Echo smart
individuals' personal data. During the aftermath of September 11, 2001, some tech companies were
particularly cooperative with government requests for sensitive data of individuals.).
53. See Schirm, supra note 18 (explaining that there are no protections from the government
and the only consumer protections that exist are those protections given by the tech companies
themselves).
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST:
INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 142-43, 145 (2018).
56. See WALDMAN, supra note 55.
57. See Schirm, supra note 18.
58. Smart Speaker RecordingsReviewed by Humans, supranote 47.

59. No. CR20160370, 2016 WL 7627013 (Ark. Cir. Sept. 7, 2016).
60.

Elliott C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs Amazon to Hand Over Echo Recordings in Murder

Case, CNN (Apr. 26, 2017, 2:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazon-echo-alexabentonville-arkansas-murder-case/index.html.

61. Id. Mr. Bates invited two friends over to his home to watch football and have a few
drinks. Id. After having a shot of vodka and some beer, the group decided to get into Mr. Bates's hot
tub and around 1:00 AM. Bates left the two friends and went to bed. Id. When he woke up the next
morning, he saw that one of his friends was floating face down in the hot tub. Id. At the time of his
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speaker, and the prosecution believed that the information gathered by
the smart speaker, particularly the voice recordings, would prove Mr.
Bates's guilt.62 Amazon initially refused the prosecutor's request for the
63
recordings from the Echo, citing customer privacy concerns.
Nevertheless, Mr. Bates himself wanted Amazon to turn over the
recordings as he believed it would prove his innocence, and Amazon
eventually did turn over the recordings to prosecutors." After the
prosecutors received the recordings and analyzed them, they moved to
65
dismiss the charges against Mr. Bates.
Although the information captured by the Amazon smart speaker
tipped in favor of Mr. Bates here, there are times when information
66
captured by smart speakers can seemingly incriminate individuals.
Moreover, the prosecution of Mr. Bates shows that consumers are
currently left solely at the will of tech companies and their individual
privacy policies, leaving tech companies with the final say as to whether
or not consumer data and private information is shared with the
government.6 7 Alarmingly, not all tech companies have strong privacy
policies, and the ones that do, like Apple, reserve the right to change
68
their policies at any moment. The difference in policies among tech
companies is significant: Apple claims that data privacy should be a
69
protected and fundamental human right, whereas Google freely sells
death, the friend, Mr. Collins, had a blood alcohol content of .32, which is four times the legal limit
to drive in Arkansas. Id. Prosecutors filed charges against Bates for murder, as they believed that
they had strong circumstantial evidence of an attempted cover-up-the fact that there was unusually
high water usage after the murder took place. Id. Upon finding out that Mr. Bates had an Amazon
Echo, the prosecutors pursued the recordings from the device in an effort to obtain direct evidence
that Bates committed the crime. Id.
62. Id.
63. Dwyer, supra note 17.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Our Privacy Policy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Apr. 1,
2021).
69. Id.; Ben Popken, Google Sells the Future, Powered by Your PersonalData, NBC NEWS
(May 10, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/google-sells-future-poweredyour-personal-data-n870501. Notably, Apple refused to unlock the phone of the suspected San
Bernardino shooter when the Government tried to gain access to his personal data from an iPhone
that he used. Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demands to Crack iPhone Linked to San
Bernadino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bemardinoshooter/2016/02/16/69b903ee-d4d9-l 1e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html. The Government wanted
Apple to create a new software to give government prosecutors a "backdoor" into the suspected
shooter's personal information. Id. Apple refused, citing broad cybersecurity concerns as well as
concerns for the individual's privacy rights. Id. Litigation ensued, and while there was no final
decision on the merits because the Government was able to gain access to the information by
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consumers' private data to third-parties in order to tailor ads and
increase its revenue. 70
The Bates case is just one instance demonstrating how the
government has an interest in obtaining data from smart speakers.7 1
Other government officials, including former New York City Police
Department Commissioner William J. Bratton and former National
Counterterrorism Center Director Matt Olsen, have openly stated that the
public interest in a case is often great enough for the government to
obtain access to personal data collected by smart devices. 72 The fact that
government officials are not only interested in the personal data of
individuals from smart speakers and other smart devices, but are also
actively seeking such information, as in the Bates case, shows how the
threat to privacy is persistent, real, and needs to be addressed. 73
Another reason why smart speakers pose a particular threat if their
data is freely accessed by the government is that they are connected to
the "Internet of things" ("IoT"). 74 The IoT is essentially the collection of

another means, this transaction shows Apple's commitment to consumer privacy and the protection
of consumers' personal data. Matt Zapotosky, FBI Has Accessed San Bernardino Shooter's Phone
Without
Apple's
Help,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
28,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-has-accessed-san-bernardinoshooters-phone-without-apples-help/2016/03/28/e593a0e2-f52b-11e5-9804537defcc3cf6_story.html. The Government's tenacity to get the data from the San Bernardino
shooter's iPhone, even against the will of Apple, proves that the Government is willing to go to
great lengths to obtain the personal information of the individuals that it is trying to prosecute. See
id. The Government's persistence in the San Bernardino case illustrates why it is important that
Fourth Amendment protection be extended to one's personal data captured by smart devices-in
particular, data obtained via smart speakers. Id.; see infra Part Iv.
70. Popken, supra note 69. Google is known for its search engine, but it also has a variety of
different products, such as Google's own free version of Microsoft's suite of office software entitled
"Google docs." See id. Google offers many different free services and free software products to
consumers, but in return for getting a free product, Google reserves the right to collect data from the
consumers that use its products. Id. Google, in turn, uses this data to market more of its products to
those consumers, but Google also sells some of the data that it obtains to third parties so that those
third parties can tailor various advertisements to consumers that are the most likely to purchase
those products. Id. While there may not be an incentive for Google to turn over vast amounts of data
to the government for free, there is a concern that Google would hand over the information to the
government for the right price. See id. This is alarming in and of itself, as the government may
already be one of Google's many customers purchasing consumer data for its own purposes, and the
public would not know. See id. Even if the government is not a current customer purchasing data
from Google, there is nothing stopping the government from doing so, just as any other third party
might in the future. Id.
71.

See McLaughlin, supra note 60.

72. Nakashima, supra note 69.
73. See id.
74. Sara Sorcher, The Technology 202: Alexa Are You Spying on Me? Here's Why Smart
Speakers Raise

Serious Privacy

Concerns, WASH.

POST

(May

6,

2019,

9:20

AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2019/05/06/the-
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devices that are connected to or that are able to connect to the Internet
75
that can communicate data to each other in a common language. The
IoT is expanding rapidly and encompassing more and more devices each
year.76 Any device that has the capability of connecting to the Internet
77
has the ability to be part of the IoT. The IoT also includes parts of
larger devices, such as the engine of an airplane or the drill of an oil
rig.78 The IoT is helpful to consumers and manufacturers as it allows
devices to communicate the data that they collect to one main server and
79
maintains the ability to interact with other connected devices. The IoT
is particularly powerful when combined with a device like a smart
speaker that can be connected to a wide variety of devices that are also
connected to the IoT. 80
A smart speaker that is connected to the user's schedule, smart
home, and the IoT can provide real-time updates based on different
81
weather or traffic conditions. If a person connects all of their devices
and links them with their smart speaker, it can make that person's life
82
easier by adapting to changing conditions seamlessly. For example, a
smart speaker that is connected to the IoT and communicates with other
devices is able to recognize when there is heavier traffic than usual on
the route to work and is thus able to set the person's alarm to go off
earlier, giving the person ample time to make it to their early morning
meeting.83
The fact that a smart speaker can communicate with other devices
connected to the IoT poses a particular privacy risk because if the
government can freely-either with a warrant or without a warrantgain access to the data collected by a smart speaker, it can also get the
data that the smart speaker has collected from a variety of other devices
84
that it communicates with. This is especially troubling since there is
technology-202-alexa-are-you-spying-on-me-here-s-why-smart-speakers-raise-serious-privacy2 3
concerns/5ccf46a9a7a0a46cfe15 c c.
A
Simple Explanation of 'The Internet of Things,' FORBES (May 13,
Morgan,
Jacob
75. See
4
2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/201 /05/13/simple-explanationinternet-things-that-anyone-can-understand.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id. (explaining that a smart device, such as a smart speaker, can connect to your home,
calendar, phone, shopping history, and other devices, giving it the ability to dim the lamp lights, set
appointments, call people, and buy items, among other functions).
81. Jen Clark, What Is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, IBM (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/intemet-of-things/what-is-the-iot.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Sorcher, supra note 74.
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really no limit as to what kinds of other devices smart speakers can be
connected with. 85 Through a smart speaker's connectivity to the IoT, the
government would be able to access a person's agenda, their daily
routine, any messages they send to friends and family, and, with the
advent of smart appliances, even what that person has stocked in their
refrigerator.8 6 Data collected by smart speakers that are connected to the
IoT can give an incredibly detailed look into an individual's life and can
compromise someone's privacy not only in their own home but also in
their potential defenses against the government. 87 James Clapper,
Director of National Intelligence, cautioned the potential danger of the
government's use of the IoT: "In the future, intelligence services might
look to use the [IoT] for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location
tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or
user credentials." 88
Technology companies use all-too-familiar tactics to pay lip service
to the notice requirement to consumers who are buying their products. 89
Choice is limited in the same way, as all major smart speakers have
similar terms and conditions pages, and equally so, it would take hours
to read and comprehend all of the language inside the documents.90
Technology companies often keep consumers underinformed about what
they are doing with the individual's personal data, and this is precisely
why there needs to be a strong and effective solution to the problem,
especially as it pertains to companies passing off such information to the
government upon request without a valid warrant issued by a judge. 91

85. See Timm, supra note 15 (explaining how the IoT can connect to various different
appliances and devices through a smart speaker, giving the government ample opportunity to get an
in-depth look at someone's homelife).
86. Id.; see Clark, supranote 81; Sorcher, supra note 74.
87. See Timm, supra note 15; see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. Timm, supra note 15.
89.

See Zack Whittaker, Stop Saying, 'We Take Your Privacy and Security Seriously,' TECH

CRUNCH (Feb. 17, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/17/we-take-your-privacy-andsecurity-seriously (discussing how large companies use phrases such as, "we take the privacy of
personal information seriously," to quell user fears and detract from liability, ratherthan to serve as
an actual commitment to cybersecurity and privacy concerns).
90. Silvia De Conca, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Owners of Smart Speakers and Joint

Control, 17 SCRIPTED 238, 242 (2020) (explaining how the first task for new smart speaker owners
is to accept the terms and conditions that come with the device, which seem to be similar for both
Google and Amazon); Susan Allen, Privacy in the Twenty-First Century Smart Home, 19 J. HIGH

TECH. L. 162, 179-80 (2018) (explaining how consumers have no choice when accepting the terms
and conditions "because of modern civilization's dependence on smart devices").
91. See Schirm, supra note 18.
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THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY

This Part will discuss how the Fourth Amendment has evolved over
time to include broader rights as citizens began to demand a more robust
expectancy of privacy, and what exactly the Fourth Amendment
protections currently offer.9 2 Subpart A will discuss the Fourth
93
Amendment's traditional right to privacy. Subpart B will go on to
discuss the expansion of the right to privacy up to the current standard
today.94 Subpart C will discuss the Supreme Court's further expansion of
the Fourth Amendment to encompass cellphone location data in the case
of Carpenter v. United States.95 Subpart D will go on to lay out why
legislation from the states cannot adequately solve the issue of
6
government access to data from smart speakers.
A.

The TraditionalFourth Amendment Right to Privacy

This Subpart will discuss the traditional Fourth Amendment right to
privacy. 97 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
98
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment was interpreted to give
99
The greatest Fourth
protection against common-law trespass.
Amendment protections were against the government in one's own
home. 100 The Supreme Court held that "at the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
10 1
The right to
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
exclude others from intrusion onto private personal property, especially
in one's own home, but also in one's vehicle, was and still is held in
high regard. 02 While the Court consistently recognized privacy in one's
92. See infra Part III.
93. See infra Part III.A.
94. See infra Part IH.B.
95. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); see infra Part Il.C.
96. See infra Part Il.D.
97. See infra Part MI.A.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
99. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths
and the Casefor Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 809-11(2004).
100. Id. at 811; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
101. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
102. Kerr, supra note 99, at 811-12.
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property rights, the Court did allow warrantless surveillance techniques
that invaded privacy without invading property.10 3 It was not until the
Court's decision in Katz v. United States104 that the term right to privacy
become ingrained within the subtext of the Fourth Amendment.' 0 5
B.

The CurrentRight to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment

This Subpart will discuss the current right to privacy that is
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.106 In 1967, the United States
Supreme Court decided the case of Katz, which created the current test
for determining when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 07 In
Katz, the Court held that Mr. Katz had a reasonable expectation of
privacy during his phone conversation in a public phonebooth because
he had closed the door behind him.1 08 The Court wrote, "No less than an
individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a
person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment."1 09
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan laid out a two-part test used to
determine whether or not an individual has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy": (1) the individual must have exhibited a subjective expectation
of privacy; and (2) that expectation of privacy is deemed reasonable by
society." 0 Justice Harlan's test has since become the fundamental test in
determining whether or not one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
within the confines of a Fourth Amendment analysis."' This was a
landmark case and a significant change in the law, as now a person's
privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment-not just a particular
location."1 2 Moreover, Katz created a right to privacy against the
government that no longer required the government to physically intrude
into someone's private residence in order to find protection under the

103. Id. at 813.
104. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105. See Allen, supra note 90, at 167-68 (explaining how the right to privacy was expanded
after the Katz ruling, particularly as it pertains to one's person and within one's own home).
106. See infra Part III.B.
107. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
108. Id. The closed door was a significant factor in the Court's analysis, as the Court ruled that
by closing the door, Mr. Katz signaled that he was having a private conversation that was not open
to the public. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
111.

Expectation of Privacy, LEGAL INFO.

INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expe

ctation_of privacy (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
112. See Marc J. Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the
FourthAmendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1349, 1363 (2004).
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law." 3 Katz was a crucial ruling in the realm of privacy rights, and it
provides a strong foundation for the Court to further expand the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.114
Another landmark case that expanded Fourth Amendment
protections was United States v. Jones." 5 In Jones, the Supreme Court
expanded an individual's right to privacy by ruling that when the
government attached a global positing device (GPS) on the individual's
car, the government violated the Fourth Amendment as this constituted
physical intrusion into one's personal property in order to seize personal
information."' Although the government physically intruded in this
case, both Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor noted in their
concurrences that breach of the Fourth Amendment does not depend on
whether there was a physical intrusion."'
Plainly stated, "Physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many
forms of surveillance."" 8 The Justices noted it would be unnecessary
and rather foolish to require the government to always physically
9
trespass before Fourth Amendment protections would kick in.1 In the
modern era, where information can be easily obtained through the
Internet and other technological advances, the government can trespass
against individuals' private rights even without a physical intrusion onto
their property. 120 The holding in Jones gave the Court the proper
framework to hear a case concerning government intrusion of an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights without physical intrusion onto
their property, and that case was Carpenter.121
C.

The Expansion of the FourthAmendment Right to Privacy Under
Carpenter

This Subpart will discuss the further expansion of Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy particularly after the decision in

113. Allen, supra note 90, at 167.
114. See Blitz, supra note 112, at 1366.
115. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
116. See id. at 405-06.
117. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 426-29 (Alito, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
119. See id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
120. See id. ("[T]he search of one's home or office no longer requires physical entry, for
science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the
direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and which inspired
the Fourth Amendment." (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting))).
121. See id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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12
Carpenter.
' The Supreme Court further expanded Fourth Amendment
rights in the case of Carpenter.123 Carpenter was prosecuted for multiple
counts of robbery and for carrying a gun during a federal crime of
violence.' 24 The government wanted to use cell-site location information
("CSLI")12 1 from Carpenter's cellphone as evidence in the case against
him, and the Supreme Court ruled that the government could not use this
information. 126 The Court reemphasized that "property rights are not the
sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations" and the Court went even
further by stating that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." 127 This ruling is significant as it is the first time that the
Supreme Court recognized a right to privacy in one's CSLI data.1 28
The Supreme Court's ruling in Carpentervastly expands the reach
of Fourth Amendment protections against the government, as now there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's cellphone location data.12 1
Not only does the Court protect cellphone location data against
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but the
Court also hinted that it might expand these rights into other areas of
cybersecurity and data privacy." 0
The Court has determined that in order for something to be
classified as a government seizure and afford Fourth Amendment
protection, there must be government interference of a person's freedom
of movement or of their possession of their "houses, papers, and
effects." 3 1 The Court has also defined a search as an infringement on
"an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider

122. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206 (2018); see infra Part III.C.
123. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
124. Id. at 2212.
125. Id.; Cell Phone Location Tracking, BERKLEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-Tracking-Primer_Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2021)
(explaining that cell phone location data is gathered by using the last known location of a cell phone
through triangulation). Triangulation is the process of determining the location of a cell phone by
using the closest three cell phone towers and their last pings from the cell phone. Id. Each of the cell
towers then sends the location of the user and is accurate within feet of the cell phone's actual
location. Id. This data can be very powerful in the hands of a prosecutor, as it can show where a
particular defendant or witness was at the time of the event, thereby building up or destroying alibis
of those witnesses and defendants. See id.
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214, 2222. The "[g]overnment will generally need a warrant to
access" cell-site location information ("CSLI") except under certain circumstances where
"case-specific exceptions may support a warrantless search of an individual's cell-site records." Id.
at 2222.
127. Id. at 2213.
128. Id. at 2214-15.
129. See id. at 2219.
130. See id. at 2218.
131. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonable." 3 2 If the government obtains personal information about an
individual through smart speaker data, then it would likely be classified
as both a search and a seizure: the government would be interfering with
a person's freedom of possession of his or her own data-a seizure-and
violating an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in one's own
home-a search. 133
While the Court in Carpenter vastly expanded the reach of the
Fourth Amendment and its protections, some circuits have since curbed
34
some of its efficacy through other rulings.1 In the case of United States
v. Morel," decided by the First Circuit in 2019, the court ruled that
when third-parties can freely access the information being sought by the
36
government, there is no protection under the Fourth Amendment.1
Although Morel strengthens the third-party doctrine within the First
Circuit, Carpenter still provides a broader reach for the Fourth
Amendment's right to privacy, and with it, the possibility that it can be
37
expanded to have an even broader reach upon all circuits.1
D.

Why Have Federal Legislative and State-Led Efforts Fallen Short?

This Subpart will discuss why recent efforts by state legislators to
regulate cybersecurity and privacy concerns do not adequately cover
smart speakers.1 38 While some states have passed regulations concerning
cybersecurity and privacy concerns, the regulations vary in scope and
efficacy.1 39 For instance, California recently became the first state to
pass comprehensive privacy and cybersecurity laws that force companies
to tell consumers what information is being gathered and limits how

132. Macon, 472 U.S. at 469.
133. See id.
134. See United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019) (applying the third-party
doctrine, which states that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information [that
one] voluntarily turns over to third parties," since Carpenter did not "announce a wholesale
abandonment of [it]"); see supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
135. 922 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019).
136. Id. at 8-9. This can prove to be a problematic ruling as constant data breaches make public
the personal information of millions of people each year. Mike Snider, Your Data Was Probably
Stolen in Cyberattack in 2018-And You Should Care, USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2019, 3:59 PM),
20
18/12/28/data-breaches-2018-billions-hit-growinghttps://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
4
to imagine that the court intended to include these
difficult
is
number-cyberattacks/2413 11002. It
"public" records in its holding in Morel. Id.
137. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (stating that the Court
should adopt a rule that "must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or
in development").
138. See infra Part III.D.
139. Adams, supra note 18.
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long that data can be stored.14 0 California's new law provides consumers
with more rights than ever before in the space of cybersecurity and data
privacy protection. 4 1 For example, consumers in California can now
decide whether or not they want companies to be able to sell their own
individual data to third-parties. 4 2
Nevertheless, people are torn on what the law will actually do and
whether or not it will effectively protect consumers' privacy.4 3
Although the law took effect on January 1, 2020, it is still yet to be seen
if it will have a significant impact on the way large companies treat
consumers' private information." Essentially, the law creates an
individual right to one's personal data collected by large companies. 4 5
In simpler terms, it makes the consumer the owner of the data even
though the companies are the ones gathering it through apps, or by use
of their services. 14 6 Although the law is seen as a breakthrough on the
cybersecurity and privacy concerns front, it still falls short in a number
of ways.1 47
While California's new law spans twenty-four pages and has
dozens of provisions, the term "smart speaker" is nowhere to be found in
the entire law. 4 8 In an era of the increasing popularity of smart speakers,
and increasing government intrusion on individuals' personal data, not
discussing either of these topics in the law is a glaring omission.149
Moreover, not one provision discusses the government's access to data
collected by smart devices. 0 Many hail California's new law as a
breakthrough in data protection from corporate interference,' 5 ' but the
law does nothing to restrain the government from accessing the very
140. See id. (explaining California's new cybersecurity law and temporal limits on how long
personal data can be kept for before it must be destroyed).
141. See Natasha Singer, What Does California's New Data Privacy Law Mean? Nobody
Agrees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/technology/californiaprivacy-law.html.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. One of the ways the new law falls short is on guidance. Id. There are a number of
disagreements as to how companies should be complying with the new law. Id.
148. See generally A.B. 375, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (pointing out that
smart speakers are not addressed explicitly by the law).
149. See id.
150. Id. The law passed includes provisions on what companies may do with an individual's
personal data and creates restrictions on when that data must be deleted. Id. The law includes other
provisions that cover what types of information a consumer can request from companies and
whether or not those companies have to turn over all of the data collected about that individual. Id.
151. Adams, supra note 18 (explaining that California's new law represents "a fundamental
shift from the reactionary approach to security governance we've followed since the 1980s").
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information it is trying to restrict companies from selling to
third-parties. 2
Utah also recently enacted a law specifically designed to protect
private electronic information stored with third-parties from collection
153
by law enforcement without a valid warrant. The new law specifically
aims to require law enforcement and government officials to have a
warrant before they can request or obtain a person's data held via
154
The law
electronic communication or remote computing providers.
Carpenter
the
in
given
protections
the
on
was enacted to further expand
decision.155 Using Carpenter as a starting point, Utah expanded the
notion of privacy in one's individual location data and codified it into
law so that government officials in Utah cannot take advantage of this
156
Under the
information without a valid warrant granted by a judge.
to be
a
warrant
get
to
law, not only do government officials in Utah have
able to gather location data from individuals, but they must also notify
the individual within fourteen days of obtaining the information pursuant
157
to the judicially authorized warrant.
Although this statute is a significant advancement in the field of
cybersecurity and data privacy as it pertains to interference by Utah
State government, it fails to specifically mention smart speakers and the
data collected by them. 158 Moreover, the statute still leaves an opening
for the government to gain access to information gathered by smart
devices without a warrant under a number of exceptions, including when
the device is reported stolen and if the "remote computing service
152.
153.
154.

A.B. 375.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102 (LexisNexis 2021).
Allen O'Rourke & Ernesto Mendieta, New Utah Privacy Law Expands Warrant

Requirement for Individual's Data Held by Electronic Communications Service Providers, NAT'L

L. REv. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-utah-privacy-law-expandswarrant-requirement-individuals-data-held-electronic. The new law was once known as HB 57, the
Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act. Id.
155. Id.
Following the Chief Justice's hint [in Carpenter], Utah enacted the "Electronic
Information or Data Privacy Act" that protects electronic data held by a third party from
warrantless access by law enforcement. Specifically, subject to a few exceptions, the law
imposes a warrant requirement for law enforcement to obtain (i) location information,
stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device[;] or (ii) electronic information or
data transmitted by the owner thereof to a remote computing service provider. As used
here, the term "electronic information or data" means "information or data including a

sign, signal, writing, image, sound, or intelligence of any nature transmitted or stored in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical
system."

Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See

§ 77-23c-102.
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provider voluntarily discloses the location information" in certain
circumstances. 159 Even though Utah has taken preliminary steps in
protecting its citizens from government intrusion into their personal data
collected by smart devices through this law, it still leaves sizeable gaps
whereby the government may be able to gain access to this information
without a warrant. 160
Furthermore, there are many states that have introduced legislation
that has failed to pass in their legislature. 161 New York is one of those
states that could not pass legislation due to political pressures and an
unwillingness to alienate the business community through stringent
regulations on data privacy and cybersecurity concerns. 162 The proposed
bill, known as the New York Privacy Act, would have had a strong
resemblance to California's consumer privacy law, but the bill included
a private cause of action that would have allowed consumers to sue
companies when there is a data breach.1 63 Much like the California law,
the New York bill also did not mention smart speakers or limit the
government's access to data collected by smart devices. 16"
The sharp partisan divide within legislatures, as in New York,
makes it hard to pass sweeping privacy acts and cybersecurity
regulations.' 65 However, a decision by the Supreme Court recognizing
broader Fourth Amendment protections of data collected by smart
speakers could bypass the political obstacles in state legislatures and
yield an effective result that protects an individual's right to privacy."
As seen in New York, the business community can also be a
roadblock to legislative solutions.' 67 Many businesses are opposed to
state-by-state regulations because they are costly for companies
operating in multiple states to comply with. 168 Not only is the initial

159. Id. § 77-23c-102(2)(a).
160. See id.; see also Holly Davis, Utah Just Became a Leader in Digital Privacy, WIRED
(Mar. 22, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/utah-digital-privacy-legislation ("Even
with these potentially problematic exceptions, the bill is certainly better than no protections at all.").
161. See Lucas Ropek, NY's Data Privacy Bill Failed; Is There Hope Next Session?, Gov'T
TECH. (July 15, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/policy/NYs-Data-Privacy-Bill-Failed-Is-ThereHope-Next-Session.html.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id.; see also S. 5642, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
165. Ropek, supra note 161 (explaining how New York State Senator Thomas failed to get the
bill off the ground because there was no unified coalition of support behind it).
166. See infra Part IV; see also Ropek, supra note 161.
167. Ropek, supra note 161.
168. Eric Newcomer, California's New Privacy Law Creates $55-Billion Gold Rush for
Start-Ups,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
7,
2020,
2:32
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-01-07/ccpa-55-billion-gold-rush-startups
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compliance costly, but a patchwork of state regulations also creates
inefficiencies in the system, making it almost impossible for any one
169
company to take on by itself. For these reasons, many companies
spend vast amounts of resources on lobbying efforts to stop states from
passing their own privacy laws and advocate for a national privacy
17 0
reform as the only means to a legislative solution. For example, tech
companies in particular have lobbied against California's new data
privacy law that took effect on January 1, 2020.171 Many of these
companies, including Google, Amazon, and Facebook, have called on
Congress to pass a national solution so that they would not have to deal
with the compliance problems associated with piecemeal legislation
72
Businesses, especially tech
around the country and the world.
companies, would prefer not to have any data privacy and security
regulations at all, but they would much prefer a national approach to
streamline the process and to make it easier for each of them to comply
73
Nevertheless, the
with the regulations if such laws are necessary.1
or face
regulations
new
these
with
comply
must
community
business
each
with
compliance
into
come
to
harsh penalties if they decide not
74
law.1
While businesses may be against these laws to protect their bottom
line, some companies, notably in tech, have shown a willingness to
support overarching federal legislation as opposed to individual laws
from each of the fifty states.1 75 The American business community is
aware that legislation regarding data privacy is coming, as foreshadowed
by the European Union's 2018 General Data Protection Regulation, also

(explaining how the new California privacy law is going to cost companies $55 billion to begin
initial compliance).
169. See id.
170. Tony Romm, 'There Is Going to be a FightHere to Weaken It': Inside the Lobbying War
over

California's Landmark Privacy Law,

WASH.

POST

(Feb.

8,

2019,

5:20

PM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/08/theres-going-be-fight-here-weaken-it(explaining how businesses have
inside-lobbying-war-over-californias-landmark-privacy-law
lobbied to change or eliminate California's new privacy law).
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Megan Henney, CaliforniaRings in 2020 with Landmark Data Privacy Law, Fox BUS.
(Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/california-rings-in-2020-with-landmark-dataprivacy-law (explaining how companies have thirty days to fix violations of California's new
privacy law or face a $7,500 penalty).
175. Id. (highlighting how tech companies have petitioned Congress to take the initiative and
pass federal legislation on privacy and data protection in order to make it easier for the companies to
comply nationwide and around the world).
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known as the GDPR.1 76 Even though the business community may not
have the best intentions for the consumer when asking for national
regulations, it makes a compelling point that regulations should be
streamlined to provide uniform protection across the country and in
order to make it easier for companies to comply with such regulations. 177
It is also clear among experts that smart speakers pose a particular
cybersecurity and data privacy concern-though there is disagreement as
to how this issue should be resolved.17 8 Some argue that, while past
legislative attempts have failed to properly address this issue, a
legislative solution is still the best way to secure an individual's right to
privacy in data collected by smart speakers. 179 While some may consider
a constitutional approach spearheaded by the Supreme Court to be
unnecessary, an extension of Fourth Amendment privacy rights by the
Court is the best way to ensure that an individual's personal data is being
protected against unwarranted government intrusion.18 0
Some argue that the Supreme Court is particularly well-suited to
craft an appropriate solution as it is an institution isolated from outside
political pressures.1 81 Unlike legislatures, which face pressures from
constituents, businesses, and other entities, the Court is insulated from
any of those pressures and can create a rule that benefits all citizens
without fear of backlash from a particular interest group.182 Legislatures
may also be unwilling or unable to pass the appropriate legislation
required to keep individuals' personal data out of the hands of the
government due to various partisan divides or political pressures. 8 3
Legislatures may be unwilling to slight certain groups and are often
captured by corporate interests, rendering them unable to provide an

176. Id.; Danny Palmer, What Is GDPR? Everything You Need to Know About the New
General Data Protection Regulations, ZDNET (May
17,
2019,
6:33
AM),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-an-executive-guide-to-what-you-need-to-know.
177. Henney, supra note 174.
178. Ryan G. Bishop, Note, The Walls Have Ears... And Eyes ... And Noses: Home Smart
Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 697 (2019).
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing to Justice Alito's view that "the best solution to privacy concerns may be
legislative"). However, even in this statement made by Justice Alito, he uses the word "may," and
current legislative action has not gone far enough to include privacy concerns from smart speakers,
which should prompt swifter action by the Supreme Court. Id. Smart speakers have the potential to
give an incredibly detailed look into one's life, "detailing everything from how they like their toast
to the layout of their home," which requires urgent action to prevent misuse of this information. Id.

at 671.
181. See STEPHEN POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?:
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 4-5 (2002).

182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Ropek, supra note 161 (explaining how the New York Legislature was unable to
garner support for a broad privacy bill).
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18 4
Furthermore, Congress has
adequate solution to the problem.
to come up with their own
states
the
leaving
remained silent on the issue,
patchwork of legislation-agitating the business community and
185
This creates a
creating short-term solutions to a long-term problem.
namely the
pressures,
political
from
isolated
institution
an
for
need
Fourth
expanding
case
a
on
rule
and
Supreme Court, to grant certiorari
collected
Amendment protections over an individual's personal data as
86
by corporations.1
A solution introduced by the Supreme Court would not only be
expedient, but better insulated from the politics of the legislative
body.1 87 It is clear that the problem of cybersecurity and privacy rights in
one's personal data is only expanding and not going away as time
passes.1 88 The Supreme Court has expanded Fourth Amendment
protections over time and now, once again, has the opportunity to
expand the right to privacy to include an individual's right to their own
89
The
personal data against unwarranted government interference.1
especially
been
has
privacy
to
right
Amendment
expansion of the Fourth
strong in cases where individuals seek to keep their private information
private.190 Even assuming that a legislature has the political willpower to
pass a cybersecurity law that creates a right to privacy in one's personal
data collected by smart speakers, a subsequent legislature could decide
191
In any given election cycle, a
to strip these regulations at any time.
legislature's attitude towards regulating smart speakers may change,

184. See, e.g., id. (describing the tech- and business-oriented lobbyists that appeared at the
hearings to oppose the New York bill).
185. See Henney, supra note 174.
186. See infra Part IV.
187. See POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 181, at 4-5 (describing the Court as an institution
"that is insulated enough from public opinion and political expediency to rule on the basis of
principle, constrained by the application to cases and controversies, yet not so constrained as to be
prevented from rising above the case and invoking and enforcing general principles").
188. See Michael Chertoff & Jeremy Grant, 8 Ways Government Can Improve Their
Cybersecurity, HARV. Bus. REv. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/8-ways-governments-canimprove-their-cybersecurity (arguing that governments must implement a more permanent solution
to the problem of cybersecurity and privacy concerns).
189. Allen, supra note 90, at 180-91 (explaining major Fourth Amendment decisions and their
potential implications for smart devices).
190. See id. at 183 & n.149.
191. See Romm, supra note 170. Legislators are faced with various interest groups-including,
but not limited to, individual citizens and large corporate lobbyists-and they all have ranging
interests in what they want to see included or excluded from privacy regulations. Id. A change in
public opinion could be the end of the line for a piece of legislation where constituents plea with
elected officials to "remember all of us," as legislators make decisions on what provisions will or
will not be included. Id.
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leading that session of the legislature to repeal any laws that may have
been passed solving the issue.19 2
The legislative solution does not only fall short in that it can be
repealed at any time; it may also fail to provide adequate protection to
individuals as various legislators may have competing interests resulting
in a final bill that does not adequately remedy the problem.1 93 The
Supreme Court is supposed to be removed from all of the varying
interests that face legislators, such as constituents, donors, and personal
obligations.1 94 The Court is able to come in and not only identify the
exact issue by taking a case on appeal, but it can also prescribe a
calculated and effective long-term solution to the problem.1 95 As smart
speaker popularity continues to grow, with no slowdown in sight, it is
important that the solution to warrantless government interference in
personal data collected by smart speakers be both effective and able to
stand the test of time.1 96
IV.

MEANS TO AN END: DECIDING A CASE THAT GRANTS AN
EXPANDED FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY

This Part will explain why the Supreme Court should interpret the
Fourth Amendment right to privacy to require the government to obtain
a warrant before accessing data collected by smart speakers. 197 Subpart
A will go on to lay out how and why the Supreme Court should decide a
case that expands upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights against
the government in their personal data collected by smart speakers. 198

192. Id. Explaining how legislators are told that privacy and cybersecurity legislation could be
a "third rail," and that they should be "careful [of] what [they] touch, be careful what
[they] do,
because [they] may get away with something for a while-but if the voters and consumers find out
what [they] did, [they] might find [themselves] in trouble." Id. This underscores the legislature's
sensitivity to the electorate and special interests that influence legislation, illustrating that legislators
could repeal or change a law that is presented with fierce backlash or opposition. Id.
193. Id. (describing, as an example, the competing interests at play in the newly passed
California legislation).
194. See POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 181, at 4-5.
195. Id. at 3 (describing how the strategic advantages of actions by courts are often
underestimated, as modem courts function in a "heavily bureaucratic policy-making environment").

196. See Williams, supranote 5; see infra Part IV.
197. See infra Part IV.
198. See infra Part IV.A.
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The Court Needs to Recognize a Fourth Amendment Right to
Privacy in Data Collected by Smart Speakers

This Subpart discusses a possible solution to the data privacy issue
199
The solution is for the Supreme Court to
posed by smart speakers.
decide a future case that will expand upon an individual's Fourth
Amendment right to privacy against the government, which in turn will
limit the government's access to one's personal data collected by smart
speakers.2 0 0 Over time, the Court has expanded the Fourth Amendment
right to privacy from a simple right against common-law trespass of
property to a broader right of privacy, even when there is no physical
20
intrusion onto one's property. 1 The Court's rulings in Katz, Jones, and
Carpenter helped set up a legal framework for the Court to potentially
hear a case that would extend Fourth Amendment protection to
individuals' personal data collected by smart speakers against
202
When evaluating Fourth
warrantless government intrusion.
Amendment issues, the Court applies one of two predominant
ideologies: the "living Constitution" approach or the textualist/originalist
203

approach.
A traditional approach to analyzing Fourth Amendment issues is to
consider the question through the lens of the "living Constitution."204 In
a speech delivered by Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1987
at the Constitution's bicentennial celebration, he argued that the
Constitution must be interpreted in light of evolving political, moral, and
205
societal norms in order to best serve the people in the modern era.
Justice Marshall was one of many Supreme Court Justices that has
advocated for a living, breathing Constitution that evolves with the times
2
and helps the Court to craft modern solutions for modern problems. 06
Justice Stephen Breyer is another Justice that has called for a living
Constitution approach that can evolve through application with changing
199. See infra Part W.A.
200. See infra Part W.A.
201. Kerr, supranote 99, at 802; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
202. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Jones, 565
U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).
203. Stuart Taylor Jr., Marshall Sounds Critical Note on Bicentennial, N.Y. TIMES (May 7,
1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/07/us/marshall-sounds-critical-note-on-bicentennial.html;
AM),
see Andrea Seabrook, Justices Get CandidAbout the Constitution, NPR (Oct. 9, 2011, 12:58
https://www.npr.org/2011/10/09/141188564/a-matter-of-interpretation-justices-open-up.
204. Taylor Jr., supra note 203.
205. See id.
206. Id. while Justice Marshall was critical of the way much of the Court had decided previous
breathing
cases, he made a strong point that the Court should look at the Constitution as a living,
document that can adapt to the times. Id.
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societal values and norms. 207 Justice Breyer has said that "[t]rying to
apply this Constitution-with those values underlying the words-to
circumstances that are continuously changing is not something that can
be done by a computer." 2 0 Justices that believe in a living Constitution
call for the Court to make value decisions, rather than only analyze the
text, when solving the legal questions presented. 209
The Court employed the living Constitution approach in Katz. 210
Justice Harlan's two-prong test in Katz was designed to adapt and reflect
what "the majority of society was prepared to hold as a reasonable
expectation of privacy."211 The Supreme Court continues to use and
mention the living Constitution methodology from Katz when deciding
questions of Fourth Amendment rights to privacy. 212 In applying this test
to the issue at hand pertaining to smart speakers, the Court should
conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
personal data collected by smart speakers, and that Fourth Amendment
protections should be extended, because: (1) most individuals would
subjectively believe that the conversations they have in the privacy of
their own homes remains private and outside of the reach of the federal
government through recordings on a smart speaker; and (2) that
expectation of privacy is deemed reasonable by society as the Court has
already ruled in the past that society expects and deserves the greatest
amount of privacy in one's home. 213
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenteralso lends
support to this argument. 214 The Court stated that "the retrospective
quality of the data here gives police access to a category of information
otherwise unknowable." 215 Not only does this rationale leave an
open-ended limit on the government from obtaining information from
devices that provide data of a "retrospective" nature, but this vague
language also invites the Court to revisit other technologies that raise

207. Seabrook, supra note 203.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
211. Navid Massarat, Living or Dead: Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, GEO. wASH. JUST. J.
(Nov. 28, 2020), https://gwjusticejournal.com/2020/11/28/living-or-dead-privacy-rights-in-thedigital-age.
212. See id. However, it must be noted that in more recent cases, the Court has not strictly
adhered to the traditional logic of Katz, but has nonetheless used it as a significant basis for its
decisions. See id.
213. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
214. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
215. Id. at 2218.
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similar concerns.2 16 Moreover, the language that the Court uses could
2 17
support a similar ruling pertaining to smart speakers.
Similar to cellphone location data, data collected by smart speakers
is retrospective and gives an exact recount of what an individual said at a
time where the individual felt that they had the most privacy: in their
own home. 2 18 Additionally, the information collected by smart speakers
is also otherwise unknowable, as individuals are presumed to have the
2 19
highest level of privacy in their own homes, and since smart speakers
are often found within the home, they should be considered outside of
220
The Court in
the reach of warrantless government intrusion.
the Fourth
extending
for
precedent
Carpenter provided strong
speakers
smart
by
Amendment right to privacy to cover data collected
221
using the living Constitution methodology.
Nevertheless, those opposed to extending Fourth Amendment
privacy rights to data collected by smart speakers may be quick to point
222
They would argue that individuals who use
to the third-party doctrine.
smart speakers have to agree to the terms and conditions in the user
agreement, which allows the tech companies to use the data collected for
2 23
They
marketing purposes or to sell the information to third parties.
users
puts
would further argue that this third-party disclosure effectively
on notice, eliminating any expectation of privacy even if the device is
22 4
Detractors may also cite Katz, where the Court
found in one's home.
held that those who knowingly expose their personal information to the
public, even in their own home or office, are not subject to Fourth
22
Amendment protections.
However, there may be issues with this reasoning as many users do
not read the terms and conditions before accepting them, which defeats

216. Id.
217. Id. (explaining how the Court "must take account of more sophisticated systems that are

very kind of
already in use or in development"). Here, it can be argued that smart speakers are the
Amendment
Fourth
greater
provide
to
of'
account
"take
must
it
says
technology that the Court

protections in the modern era. Id.
218. See id. (discussing how retrospective CSLI data can be used to retrace an individual's
entire schedule and movement history).
219. See id.; Kerr, supra note 99, at 810-11 (explaining that the Court has consistently held that
individuals' rights to privacy are greatest in their homes).
220. See Allen, supra note 90, at 184-85; Kerr, supra note 99, at 811.
221. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
222. See Allen, supra note 90, at 168-69. The third-party doctrine means that "[a] person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information [they] voluntarily turn[] over to third parties."
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
223. Allen, supra note 90, at 182-83.
224. Id. at 177.
225. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
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the knowledge requirement.22 6 Moreover, even if the Court were to rule
that not having read the terms and conditions cannot defeat the
knowledge standard of exposing personal information to the public, the
Supreme Court should still extend Fourth Amendment protection to data
collected by smart speakers because, as the Court itself said in Katz,
"what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." 2 27 This is especially true
when most consumers, although voluntarily using smart speakers, are
not aware of the full extent to which data can be stored and used.22 8
Furthermore, the Court in Carpenter examined the third-party
doctrine issue and largely dismissed any questions surrounding whether
access by a third party would defeat Fourth Amendment protection. 229
The Court recognized that by using a cellphone, individuals give a third
party access to their data; however, it swept away any concerns
regarding the third-party doctrine. 230 The Court ruled that "the fact that
the Government obtained the information from a third party does not
overcome Carpenter's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." 21 The
Court made it clear that the fact that a third party may have access to an
individual's cellphone location data does not preclude Fourth
Amendment protections. 232
This is significant because the Carpenter Court was willing to
extend Fourth Amendment protections over cellphone location data by
minimizing the importance of the third-party doctrine. 233 The case for
smart speakers is even stronger than the case presented in Carpenter, as
the data being recorded is more personal than one's cellphone location
data.234 Such data would potentially give the government access to actual

226. Allen, supra note 90, at 182 & n.143 (explaining how few users actually read all of the
terms and conditions of the items they buy and, instead, simply begin using them). Many of the
users are actually unaware of what policies they agree to but neglect the terms and conditions
document because its length and usage of vernacular that an average individual cannot clearly
understand. Id.
227. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
228. See Timm, supra note 15 (explaining that "[w]hile people voluntarily use all these
devices, the chances are close to zero that they fully understand that a lot of their data is being sent
back to various companies to be stored on servers that can either be accessed by governments or
hackers").

229. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. See Bishop, supra note 178, at 679-80. Data recorded by smart speakers is vast and can
range from access to videos or a user's media library, to text messages, to information about one's
home, ranging from the temperature, to the lighting, or even a user's credit card information, as well
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235
recordings of conversations from an individual's home. The Court has
shown that the third-party doctrine must cede to Fourth Amendment
protections when sensitive personal data is involved, and, here, it is
unquestionable that the data collected is even more sensitive data than
that in Carpenter, where the Court nonetheless decided to extend Fourth
Amendment protections.2 36 Nevertheless, the dissent in Carpenter
highlights the textualist argument surrounding the Fourth Amendment
237
analysis which must also be examined.
Textualists and originalists have had a profound influence on the
Court, and it is important to analyze their methodology of deciding
whether or not they would expand Fourth Amendment privacy rights to
238
one's personal data collected by smart speakers. From Justices Scalia
and Thomas, to the recently appointed Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh,
and Barrett, it seems likely that some Justices on the Court will employ
textualism and originalism when deciding upcoming cases on the
docket. 239 Originalists and textualists adhere strictly to what the framers
had intentioned at the founding of the country and what the words in the
Constitutional themselves mean, without allowing for interpretive
2
changes to the document's meaning in line with the times. 40
Traditionally, originalists emphasize common law trespass when
examining questions of Fourth Amendment rights to privacy, with a
242
focus on physical intrusion. 24t In the case of Kyllo v. United States, a
Scalia opinion, the Court made it clear that any government intrusion
into an individual's home is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.2" The Court in Kyllo highlighted that "any physical invasion of

as a whole host of information that the user decides to store on their devices and make accessible to
a smart speaker via the IoT. Id.
235. See Schirm, supra note 18.
236. 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
237. Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
238. John Greabe, Constitutional Connections: Textualism and Originalism in Constitutional
AM),
12:20
2017,
12,
(Feb.
MONITOR
CONCORD
Interpretation,
https://www.concordmonitor.comfrextualism-and-originalism-in-constitutional-interpretation8000920; see generally, e.g., Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia's Heir Apparent?:
Judge Gorsuch's Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185 (2017)
(explaining the effect that Justice Scalia has had on the Court in recent years and his use of
originalism and textualism when deciding cases before the Supreme Court).
239. See Noah Feldman, The Battle over Scalia's Legacy, N.Y. REv. (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/12/17/the-battle-over-scalias-legacy.
240. See Seabrook, supra note 203 (explaining how Justice Scalia, in particular, strictly
adhered to originalism during his time on the Court and how he made sure that he did not stray from
the original meaning of the text of the Constitution in his decisions).
241. See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the FourthAmendment,
129 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1834, 1840 n.101 (2016).
242. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
243. Id. at 40.
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the structure of the home 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was too
much .... In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."24
This case shows how the Supreme Court holds dear the right to privacy
in one's own home, especially in the case of actual, physical intrusion.4 5
In applying the originalist approach to determine whether or not the
Court should extend the Fourth Amendment right to privacy to protect
an individual's personal data collected by smart speakers, it is important
to note that there is no physical intrusion into the home with smart
speakers. 21 While smart speakers do not pose the issue of traditional
common law trespass, involving government entrance into a private
home, they pose a strikingly similar threat by giving the government
access to what an individual does in their own home even without the
physical intrusion.247 Justices that subscribe to the originalist
methodology, and are concerned with governmental physical trespass
into the home, 248 would likewise be alarmed by the information collected
by smart speakers in the privacy of one's home.24 9
Not only do individuals expect a right to privacy in their own home,
but the Supreme Court has also traditionally held that one's home is
outside the reach of warrantless government intrusion.25 0 Accordingly,
originalist Justices may also vote to extend the right to privacy in one's
244. Id. at 37.
245. See id.
246. Allen, supranote 90, at 181.
247. See id. at 184-85.
248. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2272 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (explaining how Justice Gorsuch believes it was a mistake that the Court did not analyze
the issue presented using a "more traditional approach").
249. Id. while Justice Gorsuch dissented in Carpenter, he makes it clear that he would have
been more inclined to extend Fourth Amendment protections had the majority engaged in a "more
traditional approach" to the issue. Id. Justice Gorsuch goes as far to say, "I cannot help but
conclude-reluctantly-that Mr. Carpenter forfeited perhaps his most promising line of argument"
by not arguing "the law of property or any analogies to the common law." Id. Justice Gorsuch
makes it clear that he is "reluctantly" in the dissent because Mr. Carpenter failed to approach the
issue in a way that would be more appealing to traditional textualist/originalist justices. Id. Justice
Gorsuch even tees up the argument for a future case, saying, "Plainly, customers have substantial
legal interests in this [CSLI collected by smartphones], including at least some right to include,
exclude, and control its use." Id. Justice Gorsuch goes even further to suggest that "[t]hose interests
might even rise to the level of a property right." Id. This language is strong, and goes to show that
even textualistloriginalist Justices, such as Justice Gorsuch, see the need to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to modern devices that reveal the intimate details of individuals. Id. Justice
Gorsuch's willingness to extend the Fourth Amendment's traditional property right to CSLI bodes
well, as it pertains to his willingness to extend protection to data collected by devices like smart
speakers, which are even more revealing and found within one's home. Id.
250. Allen, supra note 90, at 167. The Supreme Court has held time and time again that an
individual's home is held in high regard, and the Supreme Court continues to find that any
warrantless government intrusion into the home must meet a high bar. Id.
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home, as it is more important than ever, in our increasingly globalized
and interconnected world, that individuals' intimate and private details
and conversations are kept from warrantless government intrusion."'
Once again, while there is no physical trespass, there is, in fact, access to
an individual's home, as smart speakers can and do record the intimate
conversations that individuals have in their bedrooms, kitchens, and
living rooms."2 The government currently faces no bar in obtaining this
information from the tech companies themselves, and if the government
gets ahold of this information, it would be able to get a detailed look into
one's life, which is analogous, if not more expansive, than the
information the government would gather from physical intrusion into
an individual's home.2" 3 This would likely alarm originalist Justices,
leading them to also vote to expand the Fourth Amendment right to
4
privacy to include data collected by smart speakers.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that privacy is greatest in one's
own home, and since smart speakers are generally found in the home,
the Justices would likely find that they are subject to Fourth Amendment
protection from the government. 55 Moreover, consumers who have
smart speakers in their homes do not change their actions because of this
new piece of technology, perhaps because they are unaware of its power;
however, that device can provide data to the government, which the
government can try to use against them in a potential criminal or civil
proceeding.2 56 The government should not be able to intrude, via smart
25
speakers, into one's home without a valid, court-ordered warrant. 1 As
Justices Alito and Sotomayor noted in Jones, it does not matter that the
government is not physically intruding into an individual's home;
technology is giving the government more direct access and this, too,
258
should be barred by the Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Further applying the originalist view in attempting to determine
what the founding fathers would think about this issue would be a
difficult task, but it is likely that they would not be happy with the

251. See id. at 171 (explaining an originalist view taken by the Court, holding that "[a]t the
very core of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment stands one's right to retreat into one's
home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion" (quoting Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))).
252. See id. at 181.
253. See Schirm, supra note 18.
254. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
255. Kerr, supra note 99, at 811.
256. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supranote 60.
257. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (discussing how one's home is
sacred and should be free from intrusion via the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy).
258. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 426-29 (Alito, J., concurring).
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government's warrantless access to information collected by a device
within a person's home.25 9 The founding fathers were adamant about
protection from government interference in one's personal life, which is
precisely why they adopted the Fourth Amendment after the ratification
of the Constitution. 2 60
The Fourth Amendment sheds light on the founding fathers' intent
to protect a person's home from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
it is not unreasonable to believe that the founders would find that a smart
speaker's recording capabilities, and the data that they collect, should be
protected from unreasonable search and seizure by the government. 2 61
This new technology provides an avenue for the government to intrude
into the home-a space that originalists adamantly apply Fourth
Amendment protections-which would allow warrantless government
intrusion into the most intimate details of an individual's life.2 62 For the
aforementioned reasons, if the Court chooses to apply the textualist or
originalist approach, the Court would still be able to decide a case
expanding Fourth Amendment protections over data collected by smart
speakers, while staying true to its methodology of deciding cases. 263
While the Court has a variety of Justices who subscribe to both the
originalist/textualist methodology, as well as the living Constitution
methodology, the Court can and should extend the Fourth Amendment
right to privacy from prying government eyes to cover personal data
obtained from smart speakers .2 Either aforementioned method of
reasoning can be used to arrive at the same conclusion. 2 6
There are also a number of policy reasons as to why the Supreme
Court should decide a case that expands the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy over one's personal data collected by smart speakers. 2 66 Without
the Supreme Court's interference, it is likely that Congress will continue
to drag its feet and take no action in the area of smart speaker privacy
and cybersecurity concerns.2 67 It is also likely that if the Court takes no
259. See Brian Frazelle & David Gray, What the Founders Would Say About Cellphone
Surveillance, ACLU (Nov.
17, 2017,
1:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/location-tracking/what-founders-would-say-about-cellphone-surveillance
(describing
what the founding fathers would likely think about large tech companies giving the government
access to gather surveillance intelligence from a person's cellphone data).
260. Id.
261. See Frazelle & Gray, supra note 259.
262. See supra Part IV.A.
263. See supra Part IV.A.
264.

265.
266.
267.
resources

See supra Part IV.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
Romm, supra note 170. Every year technology companies spend vast amounts of
trying to lobby Congress to come up with a permanent national solution to cybersecurity

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7

862

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:831

action, individual states will continue to come up with their own
legislative solutions that will be ineffective and create hurdles in
businesses' compliance. 268 Furthermore, without any intervention,
consumers will continue to buy smart speakers, without knowing of the
extent of the risks that come with them, which only exacerbates the
problem by putting more smart speakers in the homes of Americans
269
If the
without any adequate protection for their data and privacy.
Court does not take action, there will be no winners, as Congress will
likely fail to appropriate action; state legislatures will likely not be able
to create a patchwork of laws that adequately protect consumers;
technology companies will have to comply with a variety of laws passed
by the states; and consumers will continue to buy smart speakers, which
increases the risk of government abuse without any adequate privacy
safeguards. 270
V.

CONCLUSION

Smart speakers are an increasingly popular technological item that
271
While smart
are often found within the homes of many Americans.
and
intruding
by
so
do
they
speakers can make life more convenient,
own
their
listening in on personal conversations held by individuals in
homes. 272 Smart speakers can and do record the intimate conversations
273
Although this technology is
of Americans in their own homes.
no federal regulations as to
are
relatively new, it is alarming that there
the use of the data collected by smart speakers or as to whom the data
can be given.2 74 This lack of regulation and protection against
government intrusion creates an urgent problem-one which the Court
has the ability to solve.2 75
If the Supreme Court hears a case on smart speakers, and
subsequently extends Fourth Amendment privacy protections to data
collected by smart speakers, immediate cybersecurity and privacy

and privacy concerns surrounding smart speakers. Id. Every year that Congress fails to take action
on a national level causes these companies to spend more and more in compliance costs, trying to
ensure that they are able to comply with the patchwork of new state laws that crop up. Id.
268. See id.
269. See Ingersoll, supra note 12 (describing how consumers are aware of certain data privacy
risks when purchasing a smart speaker, yet they are continuing to buy them at record rates).
270. See supraPart IV.
271. Williams, supra note 5.
272. See How Creepy Is Your Smart Speaker?, supra note 7.
273. See Bishop, supra note 178, at 688.
274. Schirm, supra note 18.
275. See id.
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concerns surrounding these devices would be greatly alleviated.2 76 The
Supreme Court is the proper place to address the issue of smart speaker
privacy rights against government intrusion because the Court has the
power to do so by simply extending the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy against government intrusion to cover smart speakers.2 77 The
Court can also circumvent the political process and Congress, which, to
date, has avoided taking any stance on the issue.2 78 Additionally, the
Court can provide much-needed protections to the consumers who
continue to purchase smart speakers-both those who are fully aware of
the cybersecurity and privacy issues that come along with the device and
those who are not.279 For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court not
only has the power to address the issue of smart speaker privacy rights
against government intrusion, but it also should exercise this right. 280
JacobA. Manzoor*

276.

See supra PartIV.

277. See supra Part IV.
278. See supra Part III.D.
279. Ingersoll, supra note 12.
280. See supraPart IV.
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